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Looking at Accountability 40 Years After Darling
Nathan Hershey, J.D.*
&

Christine M Jarzabt
The 1960s was an event-filled decade in the history of the United States.
It was a time during which many people took to the streets to express
opposition to the war in Vietnam, protest the denial of civil rights, and
encourage full participation in society for African-Americans. It was also a
period when much attention was given to law as a vehicle to bring about
substantial changes to improve life in a variety of areas.
Consider two important national changes brought about by 1960s
legislation and their respective purposes. First, the enactment of important
civil rights laws provided true equal treatment of minorities with respect to
public accommodations and voting. Second, the establishment of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs increased the availability of health
services to the elderly and the poor by providing funds to pay for the health
care services they needed. These changes prompted many to see law as an
instrument for social justice.
The 1960s were also a period in which there was considerable debate
about the proper role of the judiciary, both at the federal level and in the
states. Some criticized the courts for what they termed "judicial activism,"
changing law by court decision rather than deferring to the legislative
process as the vehicle for change. Others believed that bringing change
through court action was the best tradition of the judiciary; many legal
principles and doctrines, now subject to challenge, had been created by the
courts.
The decision in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital
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1. 211 N.E.2d 253 (I11.
1965). The Darling case involved a young man who was brought
to the local hospital after sustaining a broken leg. He remained under the care of a
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should be seen as one powerful example of a change in the law of health
care. The decision introduced a broadened view of the standard of care to
which hospitals were to be held. The Illinois Supreme Court quoted with
approval the following language from a New York Court of Appeals
decision:
The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes
instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no
longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of
operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of
physicians, nurses and interns, as well as administrative and manual
workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment,
collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the
person who avails himself of 'hospital facilities' expects that the hospital
will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on
their own responsibility...
The Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the state licensing regulations
and the defendant's bylaws demonstrate that the medical profession and
other responsible authorities regard it as both desirable and feasible
that a
2
hospital assume certain responsibilities for the care of the patient.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Darling reviewed the evidence presented
at trial and concluded that it was sufficient to support a finding of
negligence on at least one of the bases for hospital liability submitted to the
jury. The hospital could be found liable based on the nurses' negligence
under the theory of respondeat superior. Moreover, the hospital could be
liable for its failure to require "consultation with or examination by
members of the hospital surgical staff skilled in such treatment; or to review
the treatment rendered to the plaintiff and to require consultants to be called
in as needed,"3 as called for by accreditation standards of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), state
licensing regulations, and hospital bylaws. Thus, Darling recognized the
hospital as being liable for failing to intervene when a physician's patient
care was substandard and harmful. Additionally, this Illinois Supreme

physician, who had applied a cast to the leg in the emergency room, for seventeen days
before being transferred to a hospital in St. Louis, where his leg was amputated. Hospital
nurses had noted on several occasions his complaints of pain and an offensive odor
emanating from his leg.
2. Darling,211 N.E.2d at 257 (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).
3. Id. at 258.
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Court decision left no doubt that the doctrine of charitable immunity, a
judge-made doctrine, was no longer part of Illinois law.4
WHAT WERE THE SEQUELAE TO THE DARLING DECISION?

Focusing on Illinois first, Darlingapparently laid a foundation for later
decisions resulting in greater exposure to liability for health care providers,
particularly hospitals. Illinois courts have been relatively liberal in
applying the apparent agency doctrine, allowing cases to go to juries for
trial. 5 In addition, the Darling decision is cited with approval in Jones v.
Chicago HMO Ltd.,6 where the Darling rationale became the basis for
imposing liability on a managed care plan for departing from the standard
of care by assigning an excessive number of plan members to one of its
primary care physicians.
Elsewhere across the nation, courts in most jurisdictions have recognized
the concept of institutional liability, thus widening the liability exposure of
hospitals, particularly in the context of practitioner credentialing and
oversight of physician performance. 7 This expansion of hospital liability
has had a number of effects. First, the cost of liability insurance coverage
for participants in the health care industry has risen substantially because of
increased liability exposure.8 Second, it has caused many hospitals to give
increased attention to credentialing and review of practitioner performance.
One might observe that the Darlingdecision and its progeny have prompted
many hospitals to perform in the manner in which JCAHO has long sought
to have them perform. This change, in turn, stimulated JCAHO to adopt
more stringent standards that have raised the bar regarding the expectations
of the staff, board of directors, and hospital administration concerning
improving the quality of care and protecting patients from harm.
The delivery of health services and the manner in which they are funded
have changed considerably since Darling,but they are given scant attention
when looking at liability. As a result of major changes in health services
4. Id. at 260. For a brief, useful discussion of the charitable immunity doctrine, see John
D. Blum, Feng Shui and The Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation:A Callfor Change
in the Faceof the Medical ErrorEpidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 7-8 (2004).
5. See Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. 1999); Malanowski v.
Jabamoni, 688 N.E.2d 732 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997).
6. 730 N.E.2d 199 (Ill. 2000).
7. See Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981).
8. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE
FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, GAO-03-702 (2003),
available at www.gao.gov; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE (2004), available at www.cbo.gov, for an in-depth discussion of the factors
contributing to increasing liability premiums and for statistics and graphics relating to the
magnitude of the premium increases.
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delivery and payment during the last thirty years, the medical profession
has been consolidated; physicians now practice almost always as
participants in entities or groups to which they have surrendered a degree of
autonomy that physicians in traditional private practice possessed in the
past. Physicians tied to organizations heavily influenced by managed care
find that their opportunity to act in what they believe to be the best interests
of the patients they serve has been compromised by managed care
requirements.
Managed care itself has changed substantially from when it was highly
touted as the solution to rapidly rising health care costs. In the past,
through capitation, the primary care physician was incentivized to control
costs by limiting access to both physician specialists and expensive
diagnostic and treatment procedures. Today, capitation is largely history,
and although the extent to which prior authorizations and "management" of
care exist under health plans is difficult to measure, managed care
organizations continue to function in ways not generally seen as consumeroriented.
Nevertheless, Darling has been positive from the consumer perspective.
During the late 1960s and 1970s, an increasing acceptance of the
responsibility of all industries and the desire to give greater protection to
consumer interests prompted the adoption of federal consumer protection
legislation. 9 Changes that benefit consumers, however, do not come
without cost. In some instances costs are shifted; in others, costs are
increased to the collective public. In health care, when liability is imposed
on a provider in circumstances that formerly did not lead to liability, costs
are shifted from the injured patient to the provider and insurer.
Since Darling and similar decisions, a number of negative reactions to
consumer (patient) interests are apparent. Depending on the standard used
to establish that a "malpractice crisis" is present, there have been at least
three and, perhaps at least double that number of crises since the Darling
decision. 10 In the view of some insurers, there has been a continuing
9. See, e.g., Federal Cigarette Advertising and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
(2000 & West. Supp. 2004); Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14711474, 1476 (2000); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000 &
West Supp. 2004); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (2000 & West.
Supp. 2004); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000 & West. Supp.
2004).
10. William M. Sage describes four crises: the 1960s disequilibrium, the 1970s crisis of
availability, the 1980s crisis of affordability, and the most severe crisis, the 1990s and
beyond, which he describes as the "perfect storm." William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third.Liability Insurance and the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 10, 12-13
(2004). The Insurance Information Institute states that the current "medical malpractice
crisis did not appear overnight" and that "previous crises occurred in the early 1970s and the
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malpractice crisis for more than forty years. A "malpractice crisis" is
marked by allegedly unjustified increases in the volume of litigation and the
size of awards against health care providers, leading to the need for
substantial increases in insurance premiums.
It should have been no surprise that a malpractice crisis arose soon after
the Medicare and Medicaid legislation went into effect. When millions of
persons gained access to health care that they formerly could not afford,
their use of health care services increased substantially. Simple logic
dictates that when the volume of health care services rendered rises, there
will be a corresponding increase in the number of services that result in
patient injury, a percentage of which will be the result of substandard
performance in the administration of health care services. That, in turn, will
lead to an increase in litigation, awards, and, of course, an increase in
liability insurance premiums.
For many physicians and critics of the liability system, it is the financial
aspect of malpractice liability insurance that is most burdensome."
However, these critics ignore the costs malpractice causes to those harmed:
to their finances, to their enjoyment of life, and even to loss of life itself.
Perhaps these critics should give more consideration to those injured by
health care providers. The Institute of Medicine's (IOM) oft-cited report,
To Err is Human: Building a Safer Healthcare System, addressed the
quality of patient care and patient safety provided by hospitals.' 2 The IOM
reported that large numbers of avoidable hospital patient deaths, between
44,000 to 98,000 per year, occurred due to medical errors.' 3 This range is
1980s." ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 2
(Insurance Information Institute Insurance Issues Series, Vol. 1, No. 1. June 2003). Kenneth
E. Thorpe reports that "by many accounts, the United States is in the midst of its third
'crisis' in medical malpractice." Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice 'Crisis':
Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH AFFAIRS, January 21, 2004, at
W4-20, availableat http://www.healthaffairs.org.
11. According to the Congressional Budget Office, even large savings in medical
malpractice insurance premiums will have only a small direct impact on health care spending
because malpractice costs account for less than 2% of spending. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 8, at 2. Hartwig and Wilkinson report that, according to A.M. Best, a total of 335
companies wrote $6.1 billion in net medical malpractice premiums in 2001. HARTWIG &
WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 7. Physicians account for approximately 52% of estimated
medical malpractice premiums, followed by hospitals at 32%, and the remaining 16%
consisting of nursing homes and managed care organizations. Id. The GAO reports that
"physician-owned and/or operated insurance companies.., insure approximately 60 percent
of all physicians in private practice in the United States." GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 8, at 6. While that heightens the physicians' awareness of their financial responsibility
and losses, it apparently has not prompted the physicians to strive to reduce error, and thus
liability claims.
12.

INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2000).

13.

Id. at 26. The findings in the IOM report are contentious, in part because they are

Published by LAW eCommons, 2005

5

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 10

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 14

widely accepted by those working in the malpractice policy area. Despite
all of the complaints by physicians and insurers that greedy malpractice
attorneys and runaway juries are the root cause of the health care system's
fragile economic condition, the IOM report indicates that health care
service providers, physicians, and insurers are held accountable for only a
modest fraction of the harm they cause.
The existence of past and present medical malpractice "crises" has not
gone unnoticed by government. In response to the "crisis" of the early
1970s, the federal government during the Nixon Administration created a
commission to study and to provide recommendations to address the
malpractice problem. 14 The commission recommended changes not only in
the judicial system, but also within the medical community itself, including
and stronger powers for states to respond to incompetent
better education
15
providers.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s many states adopted legislation to
affect the malpractice crisis. 16 Joint underwriting arrangements, limits on
contingent fees, caps on recovery for non-economic damages, 17 changes in
the statutes of limitation, and other such mechanisms were responses to the
Good Samaritan statutes, directed primarily at
malpractice crisis. 18

based upon extrapolation from previous studies completed in New York, Utah, and
Colorado. Some believe the IOM report overestimates the number of deaths, while other
believe it underestimates the number of deaths because it looks only at patients in the
hospital setting and not in other health care settings, such as long-term care and physician
office-based care. See Keith Myers, Medical Errors: Causes, Cures, and Capitalism, 16 J.L.
& HEALTH 255, 258 (2001-02).
14. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973).

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S

15. Id. at 27-38, 51-65.
16. According to the Insurance Information Institute, aggressive campaigns to reform
state laws governing medical malpractice lawsuits began in the 1970s, with every state
except for West Virginia passing some reforms. HARTWIG & WILKINSON, supra note 10, at
2.
17. Capping non-economic damages is a particularly contentious aspect of the medical
malpractice reform debates. The evidence is inconclusive as to whether caps actually lower
health care spending. While most commentators analyze the cost savings to insurers and
providers, few examine the effects of capping non-economic damages on the injured patient.
The use of caps abandons the traditional tort law concept of placing the costs on the party
that can better absorb the cost and instead shifts the costs of the patient's loss to the patient's
family members.
18. According to the GAO, "since the medical malpractice crisis of the mid-1970s, all
states have enacted some change in their laws in order to reduce upward pressure on medical
malpractice premiums," including statutes regarding limits on damages, evidence of
collateral source payments, joint and several liability, limits on attorney's contingency fees,
reducing the statute of limitations, requiring periodic payment of damages rather than lump
sum payments, expert certification (certificates of merit), arbitration, advanced notice of
claim, and insurance bad faith claims. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 41-43.
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emergency care situations, provided some protection to physicians and
other health care providers from liability.' 9 With each new "crisis," caused
in part by unsuccessful insurance company investment strategies
endangering reserves, one or two new proposals were added to previouslyused measures to handle the liability problem.
There are basically two camps in the conflict over the liability situation.
The first consists of insurers, health plans, and most providers, worried
about the financial impact of liability on them as health care industry
participants. 20 Organized medicine, America's Health Insurance Plans, and
liability insurers have great weight in the both the federal and state
legislative arenas and seek to reduce their financial responsibility and
accountability. They decline to acknowledge their contributions to the
crisis, such as underestimating liability risks in the 1990s, the increasing
expense of reinsurance, and the mergers and withdrawals from the market
that have reduced competition and led to captive audiences that cannot
price-shop. 21 The physicians and other providers focus their attention on
limiting liability exposure and expenses rather than assessing their own
contribution to adverse patient outcomes. Together, the groups spend large
sums of money promoting "malpractice reform," which consists of changes
in the law to reduce liability exposure and the financial expense associated
22
with it.
19. For a list of state Good Samaritan Statutes, see Terrence J. Centner, Tort Liabilityfor
Sports and RecreationalActivities: Expanding Statutory Immunity for ProtectedClasses and
Activities, 26 J. LEGIS. 1, 4-7 (2000), and Daniel P. Connaughton & John 0. Spengler,
Automated External Defibrillators in Sport and Recreation Settings: An Analysis of
Immunity Provisions in State Legislation, 11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 51, 57-60 (2001).
As early as the 1970s, physicians were allegedly fearful that rendering care as a "good
Samaritan" would impose financial liability. However, the Secretary's Commission on
Medical Malpractice found widespread misperception, but "no factual basis for the
commonly-asserted belief that malpractice suits are likely to stem from rendering emergency
care at the scene of accidents." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, supra note
14, at 16.
20. Even during the malpractice "crisis" of the 1970s, physicians were deeply concerned
about the financial impact of liability. The Nixon report found that "many doctors are
convinced that the contingent fee system is the very root of today's malpractice problem, and
a number of them have proposed its outright abolition as the most effective way to solve the
problem." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, supra note 14, at 32. The
commission, however, found that the "contingency fee system discourages lawyers'
acceptance of meritorious low-recovery cases." Id. at 33. It arguably follows that the
contingency fee system, at times, insulates physicians from being held accountable when
they have committed malpractice.
21. Kenneth E. Thorpe, supra note 10, at W4-22 - W4-24.
22. It is difficult to accurately know how much money is spent promoting malpractice
reform. It is known, however, that during the 2004 election cycle, the health sector (which
includes health professionals, health services and HMOs, and pharmaceuticals and health
supply companies) contributed over $113 million to political parties, candidates, and
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The members of the second camp are organizations and individuals
concerned with the number of injuries resulting from the administration of
health care services. From their perspective, the most important issue is
reducing the volume and extent of harm to patients, thereby reducing the
injury and risk of liability. They seek accountability and transparency in
the system.
Additionally, physicians have mixed feelings toward the health care
industry. Obviously, most physicians have little in common with the
American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA). On the other hand,
physicians also have problems with the way in which health plans and large
physician employers, such as universities, impose practice mechanisms that
are often based on strict time allocations for administering specific services.
Physicians assert that their professional judgment is being restricted. They
are also disturbed by the way in which some services are organized because
they weaken or destroy the bond that in the past marked the trust
relationship between physicians and patients. Patients are often stripped of
the opportunity to maintain relationships with physicians because they are
forced to change health plans or their current health plan no longer includes
physicians or physician groups with which the patient has had a good
relationship.
Another consideration is the defensive practice of medicine, often
alleged to be a major cause of higher health care costs. The defensive
practice of medicine has been defined "as poor practice (a deviation from
what the physician believes is sound practice and which is generally so
regarded) induced by a threat of liability. ' 3 Thus, the argument goes,
physicians perform or order unnecessary procedures for their patients
because of fear of liability; they are concerned that if the patient has a poor
result, the failure to provide such a procedure would be deemed
malpractice.
Consider two evident flaws in this argument. First, a specific instance of
political action committees (PACs). Lawyers and lobbyists contributed over $190 million
and the finance, insurance, and real estate sector contributed over $306 million. THE CTR.
FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, 2004 ELECTION OVERVIEW: TOTALS BY SECTOR (2004), at
http://www.opensecrets.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). A significant portion of these
contributions was likely directed toward influencing legislation on issues other than medical
malpractice, such as prescription drug plans and Medicare reimbursement. Nevertheless,
entities and individuals receiving the monies will likely keep in mind the other interests of
the donors.
23. Nathan Hershey, The Defensive Practice of Medicine: Myth or Reality, 1 THE
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 69, 72 (1972). For further historical articles regarding the
defensive practice medicine, see L.R. Tancredi & J.A. Barondess, The Problem of Defensive
Medicine, 200 SCIENCE 879 (1978); The Duke Law Journal Editorial Board and Staff, The
Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1972 DuKE L.J. 939, 942
(1971).
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possible defensive practice would require the physician to admit to
providing the patient with unneeded, inappropriate, and possibly riskcreating procedures. How many physicians are prepared to describe
specific instances of such behavior in their practice? Second, if health plans
implemented hospital peer review and utilization review with evidencebased practice standards, would not most instances of defensive practice
come to light and lead to reprimand (or worse) for the physician? We
would be more accepting of allegations that defensive medicine takes place
to a substantial extent if physicians would talk of their own conduct, rather
than merely state that defensive practice is done by many of their peers.
It is paradoxical that some physicians are of two minds on the subject of
unnecessary procedures. Physicians suggest that they provide unnecessary
procedures, which increase health care costs, but also complain that health
insurers, through their coverage rules, prevent them from providing needed
referrals or services to their patients because of the insurers' desire to
restrain costs.
Finally, the Darling decision is worthy of a program such as this
Colloquium. This decision highlighted the process of change in the health
care industry from the horse and buggy era by making clear the
responsibility of institutions to the public they serve and the role they play
in the delivery of services ordered and provided by physicians.
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